Love v. Virginia: The Constitutionality of the Marshall/Newman Amendment by Mohan Ram, Pavitra
Pavitra Mohan Ram 
 1
Love v. Virginia: 
The Constitutionality of the Marshall/Newman Amendment 
 
They are educators, architects, police officers, fire officials, doctors, lawyers, electricians, and 
construction workers. They serve on township boards, in civic organizations, and in church groups 
that minister to the needy. They are mothers and fathers. They are our neighbors, our co-workers, 
and our friends. In light of the policies reflected in the statutory and decisional laws of this State, 
we cannot find a legitimate public need for an unequal legal scheme of benefits and privileges that 
disadvantages committed same-sex couples.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 7, 2006, battles were waged across the country in what Justice Scalia 
referred to as a “culture war;”2 generally perceived to be fought between liberal Democrats 
and conservative Republicans.  One key battle took place in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, where the Democrat Jim Webb scored a victory against Republican George Allen 
in the Senate race with 49.59% of the votes.3 Conservative Virginians did not suffer a total 
defeat however; 57.06% of the voting population said “No” to gay marriage and “Yes” to 
Proposed Constitutional Amendment 1.4
The battle between gay rights and “traditional family values” 5 has become 
increasingly heated in the face of American societal changes.  For example, in 1970, there 
were approximately 523,000 unmarried heterosexual couples cohabiting in the United 
States; in 2005 the number rose to 4.85 million couples.6 In Virginia alone, there are 
 
1 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 453 (2006). 
2 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
3 Commonwealth of Virginia, November 7th 2006 – General Election: Voter Turnout Reports, at 
http://sbe.virginiainteractive.org/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).   
4 Id. 
5 See e.g., American Family Association, Marriage & Family, at http://www.afa.net/family/ (last visited Dec. 
15, 2006); The Traditional Values Coalition, Traditional Values Defined, at 
http://www.traditionalvalues.org/defined.php (last visited Dec. 15, 2006). 
6 U.S. Census Bureau, Table UC-1, Unmarried-Couple Households, by Presence of Children: 1960 to Present 
(2006), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/uc1.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, Table 
UC-3, Opposite Sex Unmarried Partner Households by Presence of Own Children Under 18, and Age, 
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130,000 unmarried couples who cohabitate, and 89% percent of all unmarried couples in 
Virginia are heterosexual.7 These couples are already denied 1,138 of the federal rights 
made available to married individuals, 8 and have been increasingly targeted by state 
legislatures.  There are now twenty-six states that have constitutional amendments banning 
same-sex marriage,9 seven of which were adopted in the last election.10 
The Marshall/Newman Amendment, which became effective on January 1, 2007, 
will amend the Virginia Bill of Rights.  Among other things, the Amendment seeks to ban 
gay marriage and civil unions between unmarried heterosexuals.  It also precludes Virginia 
from recognizing such arrangements formed in other states.11 One of the purported aims of 
the Amendment is to prevent “activist state judges” from invalidating Virginia’s existing 
 
Earnings, Education, and Race and Hispanic Origin of Both Partners: 2005, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html.  
7 Tavia Simmons & Martin O’Connell, U.S. Census Bureau, Married Couples and Unmarried Partner 
Households: 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.  
8 See Letter from GAO General Counsel to Bill Frist, U.S. Senate, at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.  
9 Idaho, Utah, Montana, Colorado, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, South Dakota, North Dakota, Missouri, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, Ohio, Michigan, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, Hawaii, Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri and Alaska.  The Heritage Foundation, Issues: Family and 
Marriage, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/Marriage50/Dataforall50States.cfm (accessed Dec. 13, 
2006); See Ala. Const. art. I, § 25; Ark. Const. amend. 83, § 1; Ga. Const. art. I, § 6; Haw. Const. art. I, § 23; 
Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16; Ky. Const. § 233; La. Const. art. 12, § 15; Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Miss. Const. 
art. XIV, § 263; Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7; Nev. Const. art. I, § 21; Or. Const. art. 
XV, § 5; N.D. Const. art. IX, § 28; Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Okla. Const. art. 2, § 35; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 
32; Utah Const. art. I, § 29. 
10 Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See S.J. Res. 101, 
58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005); S.J. Res. 3133, 116th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005); S.J. Res. 1001, 
80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2005); S.J. Res. 81, 104th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.J. Res. 53, 97th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).  Arizona the only state in which an amendment appeared on the ballot and was 
defeated.  An attempt to add an amendment to the November ballot in Illinois recently failed and is on appeal, 
see S. Res. 869, 94th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ill. 2005). 
11 2006 Va. Acts ch. 828 (effective Jan. 1, 2007) (hereinafter “Amendment”).   
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prohibitions on same-sex marriage.12 The other is to reserve marriage for one man and one 
woman.13 
The current prohibitions on same-sex marriage come in the form of two legislative 
enactments: 1) The Defense of Marriage Act of 197514 and; 2) The Marriage Affirmation 
Act of 2004.15 Together, this Amendment and the pre-existing statutes demonstrate the 
determination of many Virginians to cling to tradition.  However, as Justice Harlan once 
wrote, “tradition is a living thing.” 16  The Constitution simply does not permit the 
discrimination manifested in the Marshall/Newman Amendment.   
A. RELEVANT STATUTES:  THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT AND THE 
MARRIAGE AFFIRMATION ACT 
The two statutory provisions enacted by Virginia’s state legislature only affect 
same-sex couples and not all unmarried individuals.  Section 20-45.2 of the Code of 
Virginia was enacted in 1975, and amended in 1997; it now reads: 
 A marriage between persons of the same sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered 
into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all 
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall be 
void and unenforceable.17 
The italicized portion of the text was introduced in 1997 to complement the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act,18 which was enacted to negate the operation of the Full Faith and 
 
12 See Virginia 4 Marriage, Common Questions, http://www.va4marriage.org/faqs.htm (accessed Dec. 13, 
2006); Memo. from Melissa Glidden et al., Arnold & Porter LLP, Potential Impact of the Proposed 
Marshall/Newman Amendment to the Virginia Constitution, 1 (Aug. 11, 2006) (available at 
http://www.votenova.org/files/final1651081_3.pdf) (hereinafter “Memo”).  
13 See H.J.R. 528 (Va. 2005) (available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?051+ful+HJ528). 
14 Va. Code § 20-45.2 (2006).    
15 Va. Code § 20-45.3 (2006).   
16 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 501 (1977). 
17 § 20-45.2 (emphasis added). 
18 No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any 
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a 
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Credit Clause of the Constitution.19 It allows states to refuse to recognize the same-sex 
marriages formed in other states.  This Virginian statutory provision bans same-sex 
marriage, as well as the recognition of such marriages.   
In 2004, Section 20-45.3 of the Code of Virginia was promulgated; it states:  
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of the 
same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage is 
prohibited. Any such civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement entered 
into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all 
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and 
unenforceable. 
 
This provision effectively prevents same-sex couples from effectuating any private 
agreements they may have formed in order to acquire some of the rights denied to them.  
Some states allow such couples to acquire these rights through common law marriage, but 
Virginia has never allowed common law marriages to form within its jurisdiction.  
However, the state has extended comity to common law marriages validly-formed in 
another jurisdiction.20 With the new Amendment, however, even this protection is lifted.21 
B. THE MARSHALL/NEWMAN AMENDMENT  
1. Legislative History 
On January 12, 2005, two constitutional amendments were proposed to the Virginia 
General Assembly.  The first one stated: “[t]o be valid or recognized in this 
Commonwealth, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman. No 
 
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, 
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.  Defense of Marriage Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).  
19 Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, 
and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
20 See Kelderhaus v. Kelderhaus, 467 S.E.2d 303 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).   
21 See Amendment, supra n. 11. 
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provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted to require the Commonwealth to 
recognize or permit marriage between individuals of the same sex.”22 The other draft was 
lengthier, and stated in part that a “right, privilege, or obligation may be bestowed on an 
unmarried person by statute even if it is among the whole number of rights, privileges, and 
obligations of marriage, but no imitation of marriage may be created by the government.”23 
In addition it provided a statement of purpose –  
That marriage is essential to the liberty, happiness, and prosperity of a free and 
virtuous people and is the natural and optimal institution for uniting the two sexes 
in a committed, complementary, and conjugal partnership; for begetting posterity; 
and for providing children with the surest opportunity to be raised by their mother 
and father. 
 
Neither of these restrictions significantly infringed on the rights of unmarried heterosexual 
individuals to create arrangements that would impose and assign marital obligations and 
rights.  
The first version of the constitutional amendment to pass the House of Delegates 
and the Senate stated: 
That in this Commonwealth, a marriage shall consist exclusively of the union of 
one man and one woman.  Neither the Commonwealth nor its political 
subdivisions shall create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal 
status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of 
marriage. 
Any other right, benefit, obligation, or legal status pertaining to persons not 
married is otherwise not altered or abridged by this section.24 
Again, this proposal is careful to preserve contractual arrangements and the like between 
unmarried couples, and only sought to restrict the ability of Virginians to form civil unions 
and same-sex marriages. 
 
22 H.J.R. 528 (Va. 2005) (available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?051+ful+HJ528). 
23 H.J.R. 584 (Va. 2005) (available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?051+ful+HJ584) (emphasis 
added). 
24 Va. Acts. ch. 946 (2005).  
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2. The Final Version of the Amendment 
The Amendment, which was officially adopted following the election, deviates 
from these past drafts by explicitly widening the scope of its prohibitions to all unmarried 
persons and any ‘legal status’ they may attempt to create with their partner.  It states:  
That only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.  
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a 
legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate 
the design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage.  Nor shall this 
Commonwealth or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union, 
partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, 
obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.25 
The Amendment is most effectively analyzed in three parts: the first part bans same-sex 
marriage; the second part prohibits civil unions and common law marriages; and the third 
part (italicized above), invalidates all forms of arrangements that may be construed to 
allocate the rights and benefits normally attributable to marriage.   
 The first part of this Amendment denies homosexuals the fundamental right to 
marry an individual of their choice; a right guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The second part of this Amendment denies unmarried Virginians 
an important liberty interest, as well as equal protection under the law, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.26 
25 Amendment, supra n. 11 (emphasis added). 
26 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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II. THE FIRST PROVISION OF THE AMENDMENT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
MANDATES THAT HOMOSEXUALS BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE 
THEIR RIGHT TO MARRY WITHOUT GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION.   
 
The first part of the Amendment provides that: “only a union between one man and 
one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions.”27 This provision violates the Due Process rights of homosexuals by 
infringing on their fundamental right to marry, as well as abridging their Equal Protection 
rights.  These violations are committed by the State with no legitimate purpose, and 
therefore, must be invalidated as a matter of federal constitutional law. 
To begin our analysis we must first ask whether there is a fundamental right, under 
the United States Constitution, to marry an individual of our choosing, irrespective of that 
individual’s race, age, or sex.  Then we must determine whether or not this restriction is 
constitutional.  These questions must be answered in the affirmative if we are to respect 
and follow Supreme Court precedent and the Constitution.  Furthermore, since a 
fundamental right is involved, we must also demand that regulation limiting these rights be 
justified by a compelling state interest, 28  a standard that is not met in this particular 
situation.  This level of scrutiny is also required by an equal protection analysis when a 
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental 
right.29 
27 Amendment, supra n. 11. 
28 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
29 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 
(1976). 
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A. COMMITTED SAME-SEX COUPLES HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
TO MARRY. 
 
It is well-established that there exists a fundamental, constitutional right to marry.30 
Disputes arise when it is argued that same-sex marriage does not warrant protection 
because it has never been “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.”31 Framing 
the issue in this way is a convenient, but misguided approach.  In substantive due process 
cases, one must carefully describe the asserted fundamental liberty interest.32 The asserted 
fundamental liberty interest in this case can be described as marriage.
Proponents of the Amendment will likely cite Michael H. v. Gerald D., for the 
proposition that unconventional, nontraditional families are not protected under substantive 
due process.33 In that case, Justice Scalia framed the issue as whether the adulterous 
relationship between persons who have a child together, but are not married, is “a protected 
family unit under the historic practices of our society,” or whether our traditions have 
protected the marital family against a claim by a biological father.34 On a superficial level, 
this language does seem to suggest that, because same-sex couples and their family units 
have not been historically protected, they do not require protection now.  This argument 
has three primary flaws.  
 
30 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to 
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuits of 
happiness by free men.  Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence 
and survival.”) 
31 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720 (1997); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937) (“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 
such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934) ("so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"). 
32 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
33 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
34 Id. at 124. 
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Examination of the first flaw necessitates a philosophical response – “tradition is a 
living thing.  A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long 
survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.”35 For 
example, in Moore v. East Cleveland, the Court held it was improper for a state to cut off 
protection of family rights at the “arbitrary boundary” of a nuclear family.36 That case 
involved the far less controversial situation of a grandmother asserting her rights to live 
with her grandchildren, but the same principle applies – “[w]hen a city undertakes such 
intrusive regulation of the family . . . the usual judicial deference to the legislature is 
inappropriate.”37 A state cannot oppress in the name of tradition.38 
The second problem with using tradition to uphold this statute is that tradition 
mandates that this statute must fail.  The liberty interest asserted in Michael D. was that 
created by “biological fatherhood plus an established parental relationship,” and that was 
not traditionally protected.39 The liberty interest asserted in Moore v. East Cleveland was 
the right to live together as an extended family, and that interest was not traditionally 
protected either.40 The liberty interest in this case is the right to marry, and this interest has 
been held time and again to be both fundamental and traditionally protected under the 
Constitution.   
Thirdly, the Court has already warned against extended the reasoning of Michael H. 
v. Gerald D. to cover all family situations that do not comport with the Framers’ original 
 
35 Moore, 431 U.S. at 501. 
36 Id. at 502. 
37 Id. at 499. 
38  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (“times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”). 
39 Michael D., 491 U.S. at 123.   
40 Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-05. 
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meaning.  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court criticized Michael H., saying that the 
Due Process Clause protects more than those practices, defined at the most specific level, 
that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, contrary to what Justice Scalia had suggested.41 .  
Zablocki v. Redhail reiterated the importance of being free to exercise one’s right to 
marry.42 In that case, a man was prevented from marrying because he was behind in his 
child support obligations.43 The Court held that this was an unacceptable infringement on 
the right to marry, which was of “fundamental importance for all individuals.” 44 The 
Court reviewed several other cases which had stressed the significance of marriage to the 
individual – Maynard v. Hill, 45  where the Court characterized marriage as “the most 
important relation in life,” and as “the foundation of the family and of society, without 
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”46 In Meyer v. Nebraska,47 the 
Court again recognized that the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” 
was a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 
One of the most relevant right-to-marry cases is Loving v. Virginia.48 In this case, 
the statute in question was promulgated by the Virginia state legislature, like the statutory 
provisions being buttressed by this Amendment, and tended to reflect some of the same 
 
41 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (citing Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-128). 
42 Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 383. 
45 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
46 Id. at 211. 
47 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
48 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
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fears manifested in this Amendment.49 The case involved an interracial couple who had 
been convicted of violating Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws, and who challenged the 
statutory scheme on both equal protection and due process grounds.50 The Court found the 
couple had been deprived of substantive due process because “the freedom to marry, or not 
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot by infringed by the 
State.”51 
Supporters of the Amendment will argue that these Supreme Court cases do not 
apply here, because they deal with opposite-sex marriage, and not same-sex marriage.  
Marriage in Griswold v. Connecticut was defined as the “coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association 
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.”52 There is no mention of this being a purely 
heterosexual experience.  It is true that this limitation may have been contemplated or 
understood, but it is also understood that the right to marry is an individual right, and must 
be protected as such, regardless of which group the person belongs. 
The right to marry is protected because of its inherent nature – it is an intimate 
union.  This conclusion is derived from the right-of-privacy cases, and therefore, our 
inquiry begins in 1965, when the Court invalidated a law that imposed a criminal penalty 
on those who used contraceptive drugs and devices, as well as those who counseled and 
 
49 That provision was found in § 20-57 of the Virginia Code, and it automatically voided all marriages 
between ‘a white person and a colored person’ without any judicial proceeding.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 4 (1967). 
50 Loving, 388 U.S. at 4.
51 Id. at 12. 
52 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
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aided in such use.53 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that the Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments created “zones of privacy,” which could not be invaded by 
the government.54 The Justices placed emphasis on the sanctity of the marital relationship 
and its corresponding rights of privacy.55 
This right to privacy was extended in Eisenstadt v. Baird to unmarried individuals, 
who demanded the same access to contraceptives as married couples. 56  In finding a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court first clarified that “[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”57 This holding was reiterated in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,58 and again in Lawrence v. Texas.59 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court found that there were some decisions 
that were so personal and central to a person’s individuality, that they could not be 
abridged by the State.60 Among the important personal decisions the Court included were 
those involving marriage and “family relationships.”61 The Justices agreed that they could 
not effectuate any moral disproval they might have felt in deciding this case – “[s]ome of 
us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 484-85. 
55 Id. at 486. 
56 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
57 Id. at 453. 
58 Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
59 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
60 “These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were 
they formed under compulsion of the State.”  Casey, 505 U.S. at  851. 
61 Id. 
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cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate 
our own moral code.” 62  Similarly, the existence of same-sex marriage cannot be 
conditioned on moral judgments, but must be rooted in legal conclusions.   
This mandate was made explicit in Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court invalidated 
a law making private sexual conduct a crime because the Court reasoned that “[l]iberty 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct.”63 The majority of the population could not use its power to 
oppress a minority and enforce its moral views.64 This conclusion is directly relevant to 
the case at hand, because the Court held that when an important liberty interest is involved, 
“religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the 
traditional family” are not legitimate reasons to prohibit that conduct.65 
The Court explicitly warned States against defining “the meaning of the 
relationship or . . . set[ting] its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an 
institution the law protects,”66 and held that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may 
seek autonomy for . . . purposes [of defining “one's own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”], just as heterosexual persons do.”67 
These cases teach us that, despite our moral views and beliefs, the rights of the individual 
 
62 Id. at 850. 
63 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (The statute provided that “A person commits an offense if he engages in 
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”). 
64 Id. at 571. 
65 Id. at 562. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition 
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from a constitutional attack . . . individual decisions by married 
persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce 
offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause . . . this protection extends to intimate 
choices by unmarried as well as married persons.”)). 
66 Id. at 567. 
67 Id. at 574. 
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to access to marriage must be the same for heterosexuals and the homosexuals alike, 
because the right to marry is so fundamental, it cannot be constrained without a compelling 
governmental interest.68 
B. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST 
THAT JUSTIFIES ABRIDGEMENT OF SUCH A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.  
 
Both the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment demands that this part of the Amendment must be strictly 
scrutinized to determine whether there is a compelling state interest that justifies 
abridgement of the fundamental right of marriage.69 Some objectives, such as a “bare . . . 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” 70  “deterrence of premarital sexual 
relations,”71 disadvantaging homosexuals,72 and preserving the racial integrity of citizens,73 
have already been found to be illegitimate by the Supreme Court.  Identification of state 
interests in this case necessitates a certain degree of speculation because we cannot consult 
a government brief.   
However, in an initial draft of the Amendment, legislators stated: 
That marriage is essential to the liberty, happiness, and prosperity of a free and 
virtuous people and is the natural and optimal institution for uniting the two 
sexes in a committed, complementary, and conjugal partnership; for begetting 
posterity; and for providing children with the surest opportunity to be raised by 
their mother and father.74 
68 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that “whatever the rights of the individual to 
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.”). 
69 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
70 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446. 
71 Id. at 452. 
72 Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. 
73 Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
74 H.J.R. 584 (Va. 2005) (available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?051+ful+HJ584) (emphasis 
added). 
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The legislature here admits that marriage is an essential liberty interest, and then 
denies it to 14,300 residents.75 In Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, the Massachusetts 
government asserted three, very similar, legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex 
couples from marrying: (1) providing a “favorable setting for procreation”; (2) ensuring the 
optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as “a two-parent family 
with one parent of each sex”; and (3) preserving scarce State and private financial 
resources.76 The court easily rejected the procreation argument, pointing out that neither 
fertility nor an active sex life is a condition of marriage, and that many married couples 
adopt children or use assistive technology to conceive.77 
The court then addressed the argument that a same-sex couple cannot provide the 
optimal setting for child rearing, noting that the state conceded same-sex couples may 
make “excellent” parents.78 The court then held that it is not “rational under our laws, and 
indeed it is not permitted, to penalize children by depriving them of State benefits because 
the State disapproves of their parents’ sexual orientation.”79 It noted that part of the reason 
heterosexual couples can provide a favorable environment for their children is not because 
of any inherent advantage, but because the State has bestowed upon them so many benefits 
– benefits not extended to same-sex couples.80 
Lastly, the court analyzed the legitimacy of the argument that same-sex couples are 
less financially dependent on each other than opposite-sex couples, determining that this 
 
75 Memo, supra n. 12, at 20.  
76 Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 331 (2003). 
77 Id. at 331-333. 
78 Id. at 334. 
79 Id. at 336. 
80 Id. at 335-36. 
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generalization ignored the basic reality that this was simply not always true, and that the 
financial benefits of marriage were not tailored to ‘need’ but rather to sexuality.81 
In the New Jersey case of Lewis v. Harris, the state moved away from these 
traditional justifications, conceding that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples was not 
necessary for procreative purposes or providing the optimal environment for raising 
children.82 There the state relied on the historical view of marriage as being a union 
between a man and a woman, and argued that any changes to that foundational family unit 
must come from the consent of the people through elected officials in the legislature, and 
not the unaccountable judicial branch.83 The court appeared to accept this argument.84 
The essential defect in this argument is that same-sex couples are not trying to 
abolish marriage, change its binary nature, amend its consanguinity provisions, or any 
other gate-keeping provisions.85 If there are to be any changes to the definition of a 
traditional family, it is only that it will expand into a more gender-neutral concept, but this 
does not threaten or attack a heterosexual couple’s rights to form whatever they consider to 
be a ‘traditional’ family unit.  So while there are certainly some situations where it is more 
prudent and preferable to effect change through the legislature, when fundamental rights 
are involved, often it is the duty of the courts to step in and make sure the state is following 
constitutional mandates.86 
81 Id. at 336-337. 
82 Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 432 (2006). 
83 Id. at 432-33. 
84 Id. at 441 (“we must be careful not to impose our personal value system on eight-and-one-half million 
people, thus bypassing the democratic process as the primary means of effecting social change in this State.”). 
85 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 337. 
86 See e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571; Moore, 431 U.S. at 501; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
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If we recognize that committed same-sex couples share the same intimacy, love, 
family unity and companionship as opposite-sex married couples, creating a separate-but-
equal distinction only denies same-sex couples many of the rights and privileges accorded 
opposite-sex couples, and stamps them with a  “badge of inferiority.” 87  Denying 
homosexual couples the right to participate in a key societal institution and all of its 
corresponding benefits and privileges “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”88 This was the reasoning in the Canadian case of Vriend v. Alberta, where the 
court stated:  
the implicit message conveyed by the exclusion, [is] that gays and lesbians, unlike 
other individuals, are not worthy of protection.  This is clearly an example of a 
distinction which demeans the individual and strengthens and perpetuates the view 
that gays and lesbians are less worthy of protection as individuals in . . . society.  
The potential harm to the dignity and perceived worth of gay and lesbian 
individuals constitutes a particularly cruel form of discrimination.89 
Therefore, because marriage is a fundamental, individual right under the Constitution, and 
because there are not compelling reasons justifying its abridgment, the first provision of 
the recent Amendment in Virginia must be invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the federal Constitution.    
III. THE SECOND HALF OF THE AMENDMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES THAT 
COMMITTED UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS SHARE THE SAME RIGHTS 
AND PRIVILEGES AS MARRIED INDVIDUALS.   
 
The second part of the Amendment states that the “Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried 
 
87 Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)). 
88 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
89 [1998] S.C.R. *38 (available at 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 19). 
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individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of 
marriage.” 90  The third portion adds: “[n]or shall this Commonwealth or its political 
subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to which 
is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.”91 These 
provisions violate the right of unmarried individuals to equal protection under the law, and 
abridge the exercise of a significant liberty interest to the disadvantage of unmarried 
individuals. 
A. UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS HAVE A LIBERTY INTEREST IN 
DECIDING HOW THEY WISH TO DEFINE THEIR COMMITTED 
RELATIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL THAT CANNOT BE 
ABRDIGED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”92 The Due Process Clause, like its Fifth 
Amendment counterpart, “guarantees more than fair process;” it “provides heightened 
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests.”93 While the civil unions implicated by this Amendment may not have the deep 
roots in tradition that marriage does, and therefore may not warrant strict scrutiny, the 
Amendment does impair a liberty interest.  The interference with a liberty interest demands 
a “reasonable fit” between governmental purpose and the means chosen to advance that 
purpose.94 
90 Amendment, supra n. 11. 
91 Id. 
92 U.S. CONST. XIV. 
93 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-720. 
94 Flores, 507 U.S. at 305. 
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Unmarried Virginians have a liberty interest in being able to protect their intimate 
relationships from governmental intrusion.  “Liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment 
“denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, 
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates 
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”95 The Amendment 
arbitrarily, and squarely, interferes with many of these liberty interests shared by 
unmarried individuals in committed relationships, such as the freedom to contract, to 
engage in common occupations of life, and to establish a home. 
This liberty interest is defined and created by the intimate relationship these 
couples share.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court first recognized that there are 
relationships that can be formed in “zones of privacy,” and that there are laws that are 
capable of having “maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.”96 Griswold dealt 
with the marital relationship, but the Court has extended its reasoning to other intimate 
relationships, affording them special protection under the law.   
For example, in Roe v. Wade, the Court determined that “the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action . . . is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”97 
The Court supported this conclusion by citing numerous psychological and physical 
 
95 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (internal citations omitted). 
96 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
97 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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hardships implicated by this choice.98 This decision was premised on the individual’s 
personal autonomy and intimate relationship with one’s body.99 
In Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court examined a law that interfered with a 
relationship that was not intimate in nature.100 Following a rule established in a prior 
case,101 the Court upheld a regulation that restricted land use to one-family dwellings, 
where “family” was defined to mean one or more related persons or a number of persons 
but not exceeding two that were not related.102 The Court believed this limitation was 
justified by “family needs” such as “[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and 
motor vehicles restricted,” and where a zone was created to protect “family values, youth 
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for 
people.”103 
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the ordinance “reaches beyond 
control of the use of land or the density of population, and undertakes to regulate the way 
people choose to associate with each other within the privacy of their own homes.”104 In 
his view, the village was acting to fence out individuals with a different lifestyle than its 
current residents.105 Three years later, Justice Marshall joined in an opinion authored by 
Justice Powell, which held that where individuals were related through “blood, adoption, 
 
98 Id. 
99 See id. 
100 Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974) 
101 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that land-use regulations violate the Due 
Process Clause if they are “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”) 
102 Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2. 
103 Id. at 9. 
104 Id. at 17. 
105 Id. at 16-17. 
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or marriage,” the judicial deference given by Belle Terre and Euclid to the legislature was 
inappropriate.106 
This distinction was supported by the fact that freedom of personal choice in 
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.107 The Court in Moore v. East Cleveland thus 
concluded that “when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living 
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental 
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.”108 
Moore, as well as countless other governmental regulations, burden individuals 
who are not related through blood, marriage or adoption, and deny them legal protections 
otherwise afforded relationships based on those connections.  However, associations 
through blood, adoption and marriage are not the end-all and be-all of protected liberty 
interests.  The Supreme Court has stressed that the importance of a familial relationship 
“stems from emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,” and 
not solely from the fact of blood relationship.109 It is undisputed that there are many 
occasions in which the blood-marriage-adoption distinction serves important governmental 
objectives, such as orderly property distribution through intestacy laws.  However, even in 
the area of intestacy, societal norms and values have been questioned by Supreme Court 
precedent.   
 
106 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (internal citations omitted).  
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For example, in Trimble v. Gordon, the Court recognized that a law allowing 
illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers, while 
legitimate children were permitted to inherit from both parents, was invalid.110 In that case, 
an argument was posited that will surely be raised again should this Amendment be 
challenged in court – unmarried heterosexual individuals who are unhappy with the 
Amendment are free to marry and thus share in the benefits afforded them under the law.  
In Trimble the lower court had asserted: “Labine could have left a will; he could have 
legitimated the daughter by marrying her mother; and he could have given the daughter the 
status of a legitimate child by stating in his acknowledgment of paternity his desire to 
legitimate her.”111 These arguments were rejected by the Court, who found that “[h]ard 
questions cannot be avoided by a hypothetical reshuffling of the facts.”112 Furthermore, 
even if we are to accept this argument, it only highlights that the second provision of the 
Amendment will have a disparate impact on same-sex couples, indicating that the purpose 
behind the law is not legitimate, but based on animus to that group. 
Here we are confronted with the situation of same-sex couples who cannot marry, 
and heterosexual couples who, for whatever reason, do not want to marry.113 If one of 
these individuals affected by the Amendment falls gravely ill, his/her partner would 
undoubtedly feel the same grief and anxiety as the married spouse, and hypotheticals do 
 
110 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
111 Id. at 773. 
112 Id. at 774. 
113 A famous example of such a couple is that of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie; Pitt has explained their reasons 
for not wanting to marry as wanting to wait until “everyone else in the country who wants to be married is 
legally able,” and Jolie has also said; “[w]e both have been married before, so it's not marriage that's 
necessarily kept some people together.”  She stressed; "[w]e are legally bound to our children, not to each 
other, and I think that's the most important thing.”  Nie Peng, "It was amazing": Jolie spills chemistry with 
Pitt, China View News (Dec. 13, 2006) (available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-
12/13/content_5479671.htm).   
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not provide a solution when the unmarried individual is barred from entering her partner’s 
hospital room.  This is an example of the Amendment’s unjust infringement on an 
individual’s liberty interest.  In an 1884 case involving common law marriage, the Court 
said: 
The protection of the parties and their children and considerations of public policy 
require this public recognition; and it may be made in any way which can be seen 
and known by men, such as living together as man and wife, treating each other 
and speaking of each other in the presence of third parties as being in that relation, 
and declaring the relation in documents executed by them whilst living together, 
such as deeds, wills, and other formal instruments.114 
So when parties choose not to (or cannot) get married, but fulfill many of this indicators of 
commitment listed above, they are entitled, under the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have 
their agreements abridgement without any overriding and compelling state interest.   
B. DENYING UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS EQUAL PROTECTION 
UNDER THE LAW IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO ANY 
LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST. 
Even if the second half of the Amendment withstood an attack based on substantive 
due process grounds, it cannot survive one based on Equal Protection.  In every case 
arising under the Equal Protection Clause, we must first determine what level of judicial 
scrutiny applies.  In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., the Court held that zoning 
ordinance in question violated the Equal Protection Clause because it rested on an 
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.115 The Court explained the different 
levels of scrutiny and/or deferential treatment it accorded legislation, depending on what 
basis of classification the statute uses.116 If the statute classifies by race, alienage, national 
 
114 Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 440 (1907) (citing Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 495 (1884)). 
115 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) 
116 Id. at 440-42. 
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origin, or gender, it must receive heightened judicial review. 117  When a statute’s 
differentiation is based on age, however, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a 
rational means to serve a legitimate end, i.e. a rational basis.118 
In summary, if the classification is based on “distinguishing characteristics relevant 
to interests the State has the authority to implement,” the state need only assert a rational 
purpose.  On the other hand, when a statute differentiates on the basis of a trait that 
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society, that statute must 
withstand heightened or strict scrutiny if it is to survive an Equal Protection challenge.119 
The Court then declined to apply heighten scrutiny to cases involving the mentally 
retarded, claiming that the predicate for increased judicial oversight is not present where 
the classification deals with mental retardation. 120  It is likely that the Court would 
similarly not extend heightened scrutiny to the second portion of the Amendment, since it 
does not interfere with a fundamental right, nor does it classify on the basis of a suspect 
class.  Nevertheless, City of Cleburne clarified that “a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,”121 and 
therefore this Amendment has no rational purpose, because it only seeks to disapprove of 
nontraditional unions. 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s promise that no person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation 
 
117 Id. at 440. 
118 Id. at 441-42. 
119 Id. at 440-41. 
120 Id. at 442-43. 
121 Id. at 446 (citing United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (finding that “[a] 
purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] 
considerations in the  public interest, justify the 1971 amendment.”)).  
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classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or 
persons.122 Therefore, the general rule for Equal Protection challenges is that if a law 
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, legislation drawn by elected 
officials is presumed to be valid, and will be sustained if the classification imposed by the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 123  By requiring that the 
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, 
we ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
burdened by the law.124 A classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest 
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”125 
The legislation here does not meet this standard.  The Amendment imposes a broad 
and undifferentiated disability on unmarried individuals, and because none of the 
purported interests appear to be compatible with the extensive and sweeping restrictions it 
inflicts, the only explanation is that the Amendment is motivated by animus toward 
unmarried individuals joined through nontraditional arrangements.126 The Amendment 
identifies affected individuals by very specific traits – they are unmarried, in love, and seek 
to protect that love – and then denies them numerous protections and benefits.   
 
122 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-272 (1979); 
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, (1920). 
123 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440. 
124 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
125 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 (citing Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415). 
126 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
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1. Virginia Does Not Have a Legitimate Interest in Banning All Forms of 
Nontraditional Unions  
 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court analyzed an issue very similar to the one 
propounded in this situation – “whether there is some ground of difference that rationally 
explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons” when there was 
an important liberty interest involved. 127  That law prohibited single persons from 
obtaining contraceptives to prevent pregnancy.128 The Court rejected the State’s claim that 
discouraging premarital sex was a legitimate purpose behind this classification, since the 
effect of the law had only marginal relation to its purported objective.129 Compelling this 
conclusion were inconsistencies between the criminal penalty for fornication, an exception 
for disease prevention, and the fact that it did not deter married persons from engaging in 
sexual relations with unmarried individuals. 130 
Similarly, due to the injustices that will occur, as this Amendment is litigated, we 
will begin to see so much inconsistency, and so many exceptions formulated, that the 
Court will realize there is no legitimate purpose behind this Amendment.   
 In Romer v. Evans, the Court confronted an amendment in Colorado that prohibited 
all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination.131 The State attempted to 
frame the Amendment as a “measure [that] does no more than deny homosexuals special 
 
127 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447. 
128 Id. at 442. 
129 Id. at 448. 
130 Id. at 450. 
131 Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
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rights;” a position rejected by the Court. 132 The Court found that this law put homosexuals 
into a solitary class in both private and governmental spheres, and effectively changed their 
legal status.133 They were forbidden safeguards others could freely access:134 
These are protections taken for granted by most people either because they already 
have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an 
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary 
civic life in a free society.135 
Finally, the Court concluded that the amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause for 
two reasons: 1) it imposed a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group 
and; 2) its breadth was so discontinuous with the reasons offered for that it seemed 
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affected.136 
Similarly, the second half of the Amendment imposes a disability on all “unmarried 
individuals” who are in committed relationships, but not married. 137  The objective 
proffered is to reserve the institution of marriage for one man and one woman, in order for 
it to remain in its traditional form.138 In her concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice 
O’Connor suggested that “preserving the traditional institution of marriage” may constitute 
a legitimate state interest.139 The majority, represented by Justice Kennedy, appeared to 
disagree with Justice O’Connor.  In its examination and eventual overturning of Bowers v. 
 
132 Id. at 626. 
133 Id. at 627. 
134 Id. at 629-631 (“Amendment 2, in addition, nullifies specific legal protections for this targeted class in all 
transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private education and 
employment.”). 
135 Id. at 631. 
136 Id. at 632. 
137 Amendment, supra n. 11. 
138 “That marriage is essential to the liberty, happiness, and prosperity of a free and virtuous people and is the 
natural and optimal institution for uniting the two sexes in a committed, complementary, and conjugal 
partnership; for begetting posterity; and for providing children with the surest opportunity to be raised by 
their mother and father.”  H.J.R. 528 (Va. 2005) (available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?051+ful+HJ528). 
139 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585. 
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Hardwick, the majority cited “respect for the traditional family” as one of the driving 
forces behind the moral condemnation that motivated the Bowers holding, 140  before 
concluding that their responsibility was to “define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
own moral code.”141 
In Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court similarly held that 
nontraditional unions were to be protected; the court delineated the advantages of 
cohabitation agreements; legal instruments that will be rendered invalid under this 
Amendment.  The primary holding in that case was that courts should enforce express 
contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly 
founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services. 142  The court based its 
holding on the changing face of American society, acknowledging that a court cannot 
impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have been abandoned by so 
many.143 The court reasoned that cohabitants are “competent as any other persons to 
contract respecting their earnings and property rights.”144 
Lastly, the court came to a conclusion that directly undermines the conclusion 
reached by the Virginian legislature – cohabitation agreements are necessary to upholding 
the institution of marriage, because a failure to recognize such agreements would only 
result in an inequitable distribution of property accumulated during a nonmarital 
relationship. 145  In addition to disallowing such agreements through the Amendment, 
 
140 Id. at 571. 
141 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 850). 
142 Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665 (1976). 
143 Id. at 684. 
144 Id. at 674. 
145 Id. at 683.   
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Virginia has made it illegal for unmarried individuals to cohabit.146 This statute is rarely 
enforced, 147  however, and there does appear to be a movement toward recognizing 
cohabitation agreements.148 
This Amendment would completely halt any such recognition.  The 130,000 
unmarried couples in Virginia 149  would presumably not break up because of this 
Amendment, but one partner would be left vulnerable should the wage-earner decide to 
avoid having to support the less sophisticated partner.  These are protections that marriage 
automatically bestows upon couples, and that couples who do not wish to get married 
should be able to privately contract into receiving from one another.  The Amendment 
prevents these couples from pursuing this very basic form of protection, solely based on 
reasons of moral disapproval. 
2. The Amendment is Not Rationally Related to its Purported Purpose 
 Even if reserving marriage for one man and one woman was a legitimate state 
purpose, this portion of the Amendment is not rationally related to that purpose.  It is too 
broad because it affects those people who cannot or will not have anything to do with 
marriage, and it stops them from pursuing transactions and goals that would allow them to 
lead an “ordinary civic life in a free society.”150 Furthermore, this Amendment does not 
target couples who choose not to divorce and yet live apart, couples who married for 
convenience, couples who have married before – all ‘deviations’ from the concept of a 
 
146 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-345. 
147 Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (4th Cir. 1986) (“The last recorded conviction for private, 
consensual cohabitation occurred in 1883.”). 
148 Cooper v. Spencer, 218 Va. 541 (1977). 
149 Memo, supra n. 12, at 20. 
150 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
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traditional marriage.  Ultimately, infringing the liberty interests of other citizens is not 
going to preserve the traditional institution of marriage.   
In order to determine whether there is a rational basis behind legislation, it is 
helpful to compare the effects of the legislation to its objectives.  So what exactly are these 
“rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage” that this class is being 
denied?  They include some of the most “basic decisions about family and parenthood,”151 
including who is to have custody of your children, who is to enter your hospital room in an 
emergency, who is to receive life insurance payments at your death – rights, benefits, 
qualities and effects that are automatically conferred upon receipt of a marriage license. 
Recently the law firm of Arnold and Porter was asked to prepare a memo outlining 
the potential legal consequences of the proposed Marshall/Newman Amendment.  The firm 
looked at various provisions of domestic law that could be affected by the Amendment, 
such as domestic violence laws, employee benefits rights, private contracts, child custody 
and visitation rights, and end-of-life arrangements.152 The firm admitted that it could take 
years to gauge the Amendment’s implications.153 Potentially, however, anyone who could 
establish that protection under domestic law or contract is a right, benefit, or effect of 
marriage, or that approval of an agreement would recognize a ‘legal status’ between 
unmarried individuals, could automatically invoke the Amendment, because under its 
 
151 Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
152 Memo, supra n. 12, at i-ii. 
153 Id. at 3. 
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definitions, that constitutes an assignment of the benefits of marriage to unmarried 
individuals.154 
Thus, the primary consequence of the Amendment may be a complete denial of 
protections to couples already facing a multitude of problems.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court delineated obstacles faced by couples who were not recognized under the law: 
some plaintiffs had to endure the expensive and time-consuming process of cross-
adopting each other’s children and effectuating legal surname changes.  Others . . . 
have had to . . . pay[] excessive health insurance premiums because employers did 
not have to provide coverage to domestic partners, not having a right to ‘family 
leave’ time, and suffering adverse inheritance tax consequences.  When some 
plaintiffs have been hospitalized, medical facilities have denied privileges to their 
partners customarily extended to family members.155 
Under the Amendment, domestic partners will not even be able to attempt equalization of 
protections.  For example, the cross-adoption process mentioned above could be construed 
as assigning a quality or obligation of marriage.  Most Virginia voters probably did not 
anticipate this result.   
On the November 7 ballot, the text of the Amendment was accompanied by the 
following disclaimer: 
There are other legal rights, benefits, and obligations which will continue to be 
available to unmarried persons, including the naming of an agent to make end-of-
life decisions by an Advance Medical Directive, protections afforded under 
Domestic Violence laws, ownership of real property as joint tenants with or 
without a right of survivorship, or disposition of property by will.156 
154 See e.g., id. at 36 (“eligibility to petition for custody or visitation rights is seemingly a ‘legal status.”); id. 
at 47 (“If a challenger could establish that protection under domestic abuse law is a right, benefit, or effect of 
marriage, and that the statute recognizes a ‘legal status’ for cohabitants, application of the law to unmarried 
persons would be unconstitutional regardless of intent because it assigns the benefits of marriage to 
unmarried victims.”);  id. at 70 (“Amendment will provide additional evidence of Virginia’s public policy 
against recognition of unmarried relationships and increase the likelihood that courts will decide that 
conferring employee benefits on the unmarried partners of employees is void as against public policy, 
regardless of whether such benefits are provided by public employers or private employers.”). 
155 Lewis, 188 N.J. at 426. 
156 Amendment, supra n. 11. 
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However, as the Arnold and Porter memo explains, because the explanation is considered 
to not be a neutral statement, a presiding court may look at this explanation as part of the 
legislative history, but will likely review the text of the Amendment and come to its own 
conclusions.157 Furthermore, after extensive research the firm concluded that because 
court enforcement of private contracts, conveyances or other legal instruments constitutes 
state “recognition,”158 this Amendment may have the effect of invalidating the assignment 
of “property rights, survivorship rights, rights to make medical decisions on behalf of 
another, are those traditionally provided through marriage, such an agreement would seem 
to be a legal status ‘to which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or 
effects of marriage.’”159 
I do not seek to examine the impacts of the Amendment as the firm did, but it is 
useful to borrow their researched conclusion that the “effects go far beyond the claimed 
purpose of the Amendment: to reserve marriage for one man and one woman.”160 
3. The Amendment’s True Purpose is to Discriminate Against an Unpopular 
Group in Violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
As in the Cleburne Living Ctr. and Romer, the scope of this Amendment suggests 
that the true purpose of this law is to disadvantage a politically unpopular group.  In 
Cleburne Living Ctr. the court looked at the fact that: 
the city also urged that the ordinance is aimed at avoiding concentration of 
population and at lessening  congestion of the streets. These concerns obviously 
fail to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and 
the like, may freely locate in the area without a permit. So, too, the expressed 
worry about fire hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance of 
danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling out a home such as 201 
 
157 Memo, supra n. 12, at 17. 
158 Id. at 9. 
159 Id. at 25. 
160 Id. at iii.  
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Featherston for the special use permit, yet imposing no such restrictions on the 
many other uses freely permitted in the neighborhood.161 
In Romer v. Evans, the court concluded: 
The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other 
citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or 
employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado 
also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other 
groups. The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular 
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. We cannot say that 
Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete 
objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from 
which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a 
classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal 
Protection Clause does not permit.162 
In both these cases, the enormous reach of the legislation into the lives of a particular 
group “raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity 
toward the class of persons affected.” 163  The same inference is raised here – the 
Amendment seeks to reserve marriage for one man and one woman by imposing sweeping 
restrictions banning a class of people from pursuing the “safeguards that others enjoy or 
may seek without restraint.”164 This legislation is under-inclusive because it is not aimed 
at couples who are trying to abolish marriage, change its monogamous nature, or amend its 
consanguinity provisions or any other gate-keeping provisions.165 It is similarly over-
inclusive, because has the potential to revoke protection afforded cohabitants under the 
domestic violence statutes,166 an effect that was purportedly not intended.167 
161 Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450. 
162 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
163 Id. at 634. 
164 Id. at 631. 
165 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 337. 
166 Memo, supra n. 12, at 47. 
167 Amendment, supra n. 11. 
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Therefore, because this legislation’s objective is to preserve the traditional 
institution of marriage, and targeting unmarried individuals does not rationally relate to 
this purpose, the Amendment violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The Marshall/Newman Amendment is demonstrably inconsistent with the 
mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.  The first provision 
seeks to ban same-sex marriage.  This is an impermissible objective under the Due Process 
Clause, which guarantees the right to marry for all individuals.  The second provision 
attacks all nontraditional unions in violation of Due Process and Equal Protection. 
It was less than forty years ago that the Lovings were arrested for what was an 
illegal marriage under Virginia law.  Today, it is universally accepted that such anti-
miscegenation statutes are unconstitutional.  Even Thomas Jefferson anticipated that 
attitudes would change; he once wrote: 
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and 
constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, 
when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means 
of correcting their ill effects.  But I know also, that laws and institutions must go 
hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more 
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, 
and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions 
must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man 
to wear still the same coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to 
remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.168 
The Framers understood that times change.  It is time that Virginia accepted this same truth.  
This Amendment is going to undermine faith in Virginia’s legal system, encourage 
 
168 Letter to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1810) (available at 
http://www.monticello.org/reports/quotes/memorial.html).  
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litigation, drive away same-sex and unmarried couples, and even affect the ability of 
businesses to attract employees should the provision of employee benefits to domestic 
partners be invalidated under the Amendment.169 
My fear is that it will only be after all these injustices and consequences are felt that 
the Amendment will be seen as the oppressive piece of legislation it is.  It denies 
homosexuals their fundamental right to marry, and strips protections from those who do 
not wish to marry.  This is the ultimate example of the State stepping inside your bedroom 
and telling you that you are not wanted, and not free.  The Constitution was created to 
prevent such intrusions; it anticipated fundamentally differing views would be shared by 
its constituency, and it provided for this conflict.  Time and again, the courts have held that 
there are certain rights that cannot be abridged by the State.  The majority simply cannot 
enforce its views on the minority in a way this Amendment will do.170 
169 See Memo, supra n. 12.  
170 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. 
